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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN A. GEORGEDES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

No. 17073

BONI A. GEORGEDES,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in divorce.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A Decree of Divorce was entered awarding each of the parties
a Decree of Divorce from the other; awarding plaintiff all home
and business real property and other business and personal assets;
awarding defendant certain personal property and restoration
of her former name.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an equitable division of jointly owned real
property, an award of alimony reasonably related to her prior
household allowance, and an award of attorney's fees incurred
in this action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-appellant, Boni A. Georgedes (hereinafter "Boni")
was married to plaintiff-respondent, John A. Georgedes (hereinafter "John"), on April 15, 1972. (F.F. 2, R. 120).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At the time of the marriage of the parties, John operated a.
laundry and dry cleaning business which he was purchasing from h:
father, (F.F. 5, R. 121) and a home which he had acquired prior

1..

"

the marriage. (F.F. 5, R. 121).
At the time this action was commenced and for about seven
(7) years prior, John and Boni were owners, subject to debts
thereon, of the home of the parties and Price Self Service Laun-

..

dry, including the building and land. (F.F. 5, R. 121; Ex. 7, 8)
For the greatest part of their marriage, John paid Boni
a household allowance of six hundred dollars ($600.00) per month
(Tr. 10, L. 19-25) with which she purchased food for the family
•:

and household furniture (Tr. 71, L. 19-23; Tr. 78, L. 19-22), aru
improved the home of the parties.

(Tr. 69, L. 16-20).

From early in the marriage difficulties arose between the
I

parties which Boni sought to resolve by obtaining counseling,
but which John declined. (Tr. 35, L. 3-25; Tr. 36, L. 1-7; Tr. i
L. 12-16).
Boni has a son by a prior marriage who receives veteran's
and social security survivor's benefits and is the beneficiary
of a trust account established by the Utah Industrial Commission
arising from the death of his father in an industrial accident .
.( R • 9 5 ; R • 10 1 ; F • F . 8 , R • 12 3 ) .

Following trial of the matter, the Court entered its Memora·
dum Decision on October 15, 1979. (R. 92-97).

Defendant's motia

for a new trial was filed November 26, 1979, (R. 98-100), in-
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eluding as a basis therefor the claim that the award to defendant
was inadequate, appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice.

The Court then entered a "Supplemental

Order" (R. 111) authorizing restoration to Boni of her former
name.

Defendant thereafter moved the Court for an Order to Show

Cause generally seeking enforcement of compliance with the Rules
of Practice of the District Courts (R. 113) which was denied.
(R. 119).

Ultimately, on March 19, 1980, Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce were entered (R.
120-128) and on March 31, 1980, defendant's motion for a new trial
was denied. (R. 136-138).
Whereupon this appeal was taken.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE LAWFUL
MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES IN AWARDING PROPERTY
AND SUPPORT
The court found (F.F. 2, R. 120) that, "Plaintiff and defendant were married on April 15, 1972, since which time they have
been and now are husband and wife."

In contradiction of that

finding of lawful marriage, the court expressly based denial
~f

alimony upon, among other things, "that the actual factual

marriage relationship of the parties was an extreme short duration."

(R. 93-94; F.F. 10; R. 124).

The conclusion is ines-

capable that the court's determination in this regard affected
all other matters before it, including award of marital property.
-3-
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The contradiction itself begs logic; the findings of the
court amount to a nunc pro tune determination of divorce a mensa
et thoro.

Even in this analogy, the court may not ignore the
(24 Am.Jur. 2d,

obligation of support a husband owes his wife.

Divorce and Separation, Section 1, n.1, citing Pettis v. Pettis,
....

91 Conn. 608, 101 A 13, 4 ALR 852)
In relying upon the artificially truncated length of the

marriage, the trial court has flown in the face of prior decisior ·_
of this Court.

In English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977):

:~

this Court condemned, "the standard utilized by the trial court, ;:
vis., the length of the marriage and the contributions of each
to their joint financial success [as] ... an appropriate measure
to determine alimony."
The legislature of the State of Utah has enacted laws gover :.
ing the marriage relationship (Section 30-1-1,

et.~-,

U.C.A.

1953, as amended) and, no determination having been made that th·:
marriage is void or voidable, or any challenge to its legality
having been raised, the trial court improperly chose to disregar
the legal status of the marriage, and, further, to impose a
judicial interpretation which violates the separation of powers
"'

mandated by Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution of Utah.
In the event this matter is remanded for trial, the trial
court should be instructed to consider this matter in light of t
actual legal period of the marriage.
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Point II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIVESTING THE DEFENDANT
OF HER JOINT TENANCY INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY
A trial court may not ignore the conveyance of real property
to a spouse (e.g., R. 94) such as here, where John conveyed to
Boni a joint tenancy interest in one of the businesses and the
home of the parties seven years prior to the divorce, but, must
presume the validity of the conveyance.

(Section 30-2-2 U.C.A.,

as amended) .
The court made extensive findings under the rubric "Def endant's Property" (R. 123, para. 8), but did little more than
list assets under the rubric "Plaintiff's Property" (F.F. 5,
R. 121).

While the court found that "during the initial year of the
marriage, plaintiff placed his wife's name as a joint tenant
with him on the family home and the coin operated laundry in
Price, Utah" [emphasis added] (F.F. 5, R. 121), that language
denigrates the legal status of the parties, relative to the property, which might more accurately be stated that "from approximately
seven years prior to initiation of this action, plaintiff and
defendant owned, as joint tenants, the home of the parties and the
coin operated laundry in Price, Utah."

Inasmuch as those jointly

owned properties were treated as "Plaintiff's Property." (F.F. 5,
R. 1212) the court demonstrated a predisposition to award the
joint tenancy property to John by simply dismissing the conveyance
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out-of-hand as an irrelevancy.
Al though a trial court has "the power to take property from
one spouse and to award it to another where the interests of
justice so requires," "the court cannot act arbitrarily or on
supposition or on conjecture as to facts upon which to justify
its order." Iverson

v~

Iverson, Utah, 526 P.2d 1126 (1974)

citin~

Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (1966).
Thus in taking property from one spouse and awarding it to the
other, as was done here with joint property, it seems clear that
a trial court must make specific findings upon which the award
is based, and resort should not be made to ex post facto editoric
synopsizing of the findings to justify the action. (R. 131, para.
2)

Where, as here, a court awards all of the capital assets of
marriage to one party, all factual matters should be scrutinized
to insure that the court's division of property is equitable.
(Pope v. Pope, Utah 589 P.2d 752, 753 (1978)).
The trial court ignored Boni's legal ownership of these
assets; her continued contribution to their acquisition during tl
marriage; her liability for debts attendant to their acquisition
and preservation; the legislative direction that conveyances
between husband and wife are to be treated as valid as if made
between other persons (30-2-3, U.C.A. 1953, as

amend~d);

and

tr~

a wife's property rights are independent of her husband and may
not be dismissed at the whim of the trial court (Section 30-2-1,
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u.c.A. 1953, as amended).
The only evidence given as to the value of the home of the
parties was the unrebutted testimony of Boni (Tr. 69, L. 4-9)
that the home was conservatively worth seventh thousand dollars
($70,000.00); at about the time of the marriage the home was
appraised as having a value of twenty nine thousand dollars
($29,000.00).

(R. 62, Ans. 4(e)).

Debt on the property at about

the time of initiation of this action totaled $16,219.20, (R.
40-41, Ans. 6(b) and 6(c)), resulting in apparent equity of approximately fifty three thousand dollars ($53,000.00), and an
increase in value during the marriage of approximately forty one
thousand dollars ($41,000.00).
As to the business owned in joint tenancy, the Price Self
Service Laundry, the only evidence was the undisputed testimony of
Boni (Tr. 70, L. 21-25) that it had a conservative value of seventy five thousand ($75,000.00) to one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000.00).

Plaintiff supplied an appraisal made in April,

1975, showing the premises to have a fair market value of
$48,167.00 (R. 79-81).

The debt against the Price Self Service

Laundry as of June 11, 1979, was $19,054.79 (R. 40, Ans. 6(a)),
and a portion of the balance owing to his father totaling
$46,351.25 as of July 1, 1979, (R. 41, Ans. 6(a)).

Since the

total agreed upon purchase price (R. 66-67) allocated to the Price
Self Service Laundry of forty seven thousand dollars ($47,000.00)
represents forty two percent of the total purchase price for the
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laundry business, the pro rata amount owing to John's father for
the Price Self Service Laundry would be $19,467.53.

There is t~

apparent equity in the Price Self Service Laundry owned jointly}
the parties of between thirty eight thousand dollars ($38,000.00
and sixty three thousand dollars ($63,000.00).
Having concluded, as to the business, that, "except for
perhaps the inflated value attached to the real property, there:
not evidence before the court of any increase in net worth that :
not offset by the increase in indebtedness [and that] the evideru
shows that the business has little value from an income standpoi1
and remains open purely as a result of the charity of

plaint~ff'i

father" and as to the home, that "there is no evidence presented
to the court to show what [the increase in value during the marriage] may be," ( R. 94) the calculations set forth above to demo1
strate equity were rendered unnecessary.
It cannot pass without remark that John, at every step,
disclaimed any ability to express an opinion as to value of the
joint property of the parties (R. 60, Ans. l(i), 2(i), 3(f), 4(f
Tr. 42, L. 24-25, Tr. 43, L. 1-7) and that the court only reluctantly permitted Boni to express an opinion as to the values '
the property (Tr. 70, L. 3-14), and misstated Utah law in supper·
of its apparent intent to disregard her opinion.

(State of Utah

by and through its Road Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 4
P.2d 507 (1970) citing Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., v. Schramm, 56
Utah 53, 189 P. 90).

In addition, "it has long been the rule in
-8-
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this state that an owner of real property, who is familiar with
his property, is entitled to testify as to its value and to give
his opinion thereon." Williams v. Oldroyd, Utah, 581 P.2d 561
(1978) citing Provo River Water Users Ass'n v. Carlson, 103 Utah
93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943).
By its action, the trial court has divested Boni of her joint
tenancy interest in property having equity, according to her
testimony which was the only evidence presented as to value,
'totaling between ninety one thousand dollars ($91,000.00) and one
hundred sixteen thousand ($116,000.00).

Point III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THIRD
PARTY INCOME AND ASSETS IN MAKING AWARDS OF
PROPERTY AND ALIMONY
The trial court made much of the fact (F.F. 8, R. 123) that
by John's support of Boni's child, "assets had been accumulated
having an aggregate value in excess of $25,000.00."

The court

acknowledged the parties' agreement that survivor's benefits
payable to Boni's child were to be put in savings for the child's
future (Tr. 85, L. 25; Tr. 8, L. 1-13; Tr. 59, L. 15-19), but
regarded those savings as an asset "which she can see as she sees
fit" (R. 95, F.F. 8, R. 123) contrary to Boni's unrebutted testimony (Tr. 60, L. 24-25; Tr. 61 L. 1, 2) and affirmation of the
fact by the Industrial Commission of Utah (R. 101) that "the money
deposited in [the savings account for Troy G. Nichols, minor son
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Gary Nichols, deceased] is not meant to provide monthly suppo1
money.

It can be withdrawn upon application to and approval

by the Industrial Commission if good cause is shown."

The exist ..

ence and conditional nature of that account were well known to
counsel for plaintiff who, as an officer of Carbon Emery Bank
(R. 134, para. 2) received the Industrial Commission award (R.
105), and as a director of Zions First National Bank, successor
to Carbon Emery Bank, apparently remains privy to information
regarding that account. (Tr. 60, L. 14-25; Tr. 61, L. 1-25; Tr.
62, L. 1-25).

Since the court indicated a clear intent (Tr.

62, L. 4-6) to regard that savings account as Boni's own

money;~

an asset acquired by her as a result of the marriage (F.F. 8,
R. 123); and as an asset to off set increased value in the home P
95), no amount of evidence could have altered the result.
The balance of the funds, being held in an informal trust
arrangement pursuant to agreement of the parties, should not
be disturbed by regarding the accumulated amounts as a "trade
off" for any support which John may have rendered Boni's child.
Since commencement of this action, the legislature of the
State of Utah has declared the public policy that, "a step parent
shall support a step child to the same extent that a natural or
adoptive parent is required to support a child." (78-45-4.1,
U.C.A. 1953, as amended).

While not retrospectively applicable

t

this actic). , that enactment simply continues and reinforces the
practical fact of life that support of a step child cannot
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reali~

tically be regarded apart from support rendered its parent.
Research does not disclose a case where a trial court has
evaluated support rendered a step child and regarded that
calculated amount as an asset of the child's natural parent in
awarding division of property.

The court further, erroneously,

regarded monthly benefit payments to Boni's child in computing her
monthly income (R. 124, para. 9).

Inasmuch as John has no continu-

ing obligation to support Boni's child by a prior marriage, the
child's income and expenses are not properly considered in establishing the need for alimony.

Boni's affidavit (R. 22) fairly

stated her monthly expenses, and it must have been against that
unrebutted figure that the court should have examined Boni's need
for support.
Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING PLAINTIFF'S
HISTORICAL ABILITY TO PAY SUPPORT IN
DENYING ALIMONY
"In the recent decisions of Cummings v. Cummings, 562 P.2d
229, 1977, and Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256, 1977,
this court ruled the trial court may properly consider a husband's
historical earning ability, when he has experienced a temporary
decrease in income, when determining the amount he should contribute for the support and maintenance of his family.

Tt~~

principle

should be equally applicable, when the husband experiences unusual
prosperity during one year. (English v. Engli- :, supra). Somehow,
during the greatest part of this seven year marriage, John was
-11-
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able to pay Boni a household allowance of six hundred dollars
($600.00) per month for nearly seven years, until just shortly
before the complaint was filed (Tr. 3 7, L. 9-22) , and was able tc
make all other monthly payments. (Tr. 38, L.3-6). It may well be
that inadvertance has permitted the one hundred precent cash
operation of the Helper Coin-Op, eighty percent cash operation

oj

the Price Self Service Laundry, and the nineteen percent cash
operation of the Price Steam Laundry (R. 64, Ans. ll(a)) to escaI
John's bookkeeping, although they were available for support of
the family during the marriage.
The court's finding (F.F. 10, R. 124) "that the plaintiff
does not have the ability to pay alimony" appears to be based
principally upon the fact that "he is required to pay for the
support and insurances for his children by a his first marriage,

(F.F. 7, R. 123), which obligations will shortly terminate (Ex. (
Decree of Divorce, p. 3, para. 2 and 3) and which, in any event,
he has not paid according to the terms of the Decree. (Tr. 21,
23-24, passim).

Moreover, the support obligations were in exis-

tence and known to John at the time he entered into marriage witl
Boni, and the marriage altered neither the prior support obligation nor his treatment of that obligation.
The evidence given in the case does not support John's clai·
of impecuniosity.

Until just prior to the divorce, he was well

able to support his family by paying ordinary bills in addition
a household allowance.

(Tr. 37-38).

While the court refused to
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allow testimony regarding the possibility that John's father had
no intention of collecting the balance of the purchase price for
the business (Tr. 42), there is a clear inference that this is the
fact.
John's marriage to Boni, knowing that she depended upon him
financially just as he depended upon her for the amenities of
marriage including household management, requires that he assist
her financially until, at the very least, she can achieve the
financial independence she is actively seeking. (Tr. 64, 72).
The apparent contradiction of John's precarious financial
condition contrasted with a local bank's willingness to loan
him money without current financial statements (Tr. 88, L. 16-18)
is probably best explained by the remark of John's counsel (whose
official banking position must be remembered) that "this is just
a little country town and everybody knows what you've got." (Tr.
89, L. 22-23).
Point V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
Boni testified (Tr. 81, L. 4-8) regarding her arrangement
for attorney's fees in this matter.
~or

Neither the court nor counsel

the plaintiff questioned the arrangement, the total fees,

nor their reasonableness.

The very bulk of the record eloquent-

ly demonstrates the devotion of so many hours of time in attempting to resolve, and later defending, this action.
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Much of

the effort of Boni' s counsel was expended in attempting to secure
faithful performance of rules promulgated by this Court and the
avoidance of procedural conduct of the case prejudicial to Boni's
interest.
Apart from the plaintiff's fault in aggrandizing Boni's
attorney's fees, which should be considered, the court failed to
consider that, in awarding John all of the income and income
producing assets of the marriage, it had deprived Boni of any
realistic practical means of paying her attorneys fees.
In denying any award, the Court again relied upon the survivor's benefits which had been accumulated for Boni's son. (R.
96 )) •

Based upon John's fault in the conduct of this action, and
Boni' s financial inability, this Court should order that John

pa~

Boni's attorney's fees incurred in defending the action and
prosecuting this appeal.
Point VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
A NEW TRIAL
One of the grounds upon which defendant sought a new trial
was "excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been givE
under the influence of passion or prejudice."

(R.98, para. 2).

The conduct of the suit, the transcript, and the orders
of the court are replete with examples of bias which favor the
plaintiff.
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Notwithstanding the extreme difficulty with which information
was extracted from the plaintiff upon written interrogatories,
over the objection of counsel for defendant, the court set a
trial date which effectively foreclosed further, fruitful discovery. (R. 58)
The court failed to comply with Rule 4.1 of the Rules of
Practice of the District Courts by setting a special trial date at
a time when the plaintiff was in default by having failed to
answer the counter-claim; this matter not being one of extraordinary urgency; notice of a special trial setting to all parties
upon good cause shown was not given; and there was no written
stipulation as required by Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice of the
Seventh Judicial District Court.
I

In trial, the court refused to allow questioning of the plaintiff regarding possible forgiveness of a debt owing to his father
(Tr. 42) although the court utilized that debt in calculating
plaintiff's total indebtedness (R. 122); the court quarreled with
the defendant's right to state an opinion as to her estimate of
value of real property of the marriage, but in a manner indicative
of intent to disregard the opinion allowed her testimony (T. 70).
The court refused to allow testimony regarding income to be derived from Boni's child's assets (T. 67-68) though he had previously permitted testimony relative to those assets on examination by counsel for plairttiff, over objection (T. 51), and though
he ultimately used that prospective income in assessing defen-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dant's need for alimony (R. 124 para. 9).
Post-trial, the court failed to require compliance with Rule
2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts that a proposed Decree be filed within fifteen (15) days after the ruling

c

the court, and, when the failure was brought to the court's attention pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice, the court
permitted the matter to be set for hearing upon notice inadequate
under Rule 6(a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 2.8(d) of the Rules of Practice, and at that hearing simply
struck the matter.
The admissions and refusal to admit testimony at trial, and
the findings and various orders of the court demonstrates a cleat
pattern by the court to so construct the evidence as to extinguish, by ignoring, Boni's rights. in marital property and her
right to support.
CONCLUSION
The trial court effectively decreed an annulment of this
seven year marriage.

Equity dictates no less than that the joint

property of the parties be sold and equity divided between them;
that there should be awarded alimony not less than the five
hundred dollars ($500.00) a month she last received as a househo:
allowance; and that she be awarded her attorney's fees incurred
principally by the respondent's lack of good faith in conduct of
this case, and her financial inability to bear the costs and
expenses incurred in defending the action and prosecuting this
-16-
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